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GOING ABROAD: HR POLICIES, 
NATIONAL IR SYSTEMS, AND UNION ACTIVITY 
IN FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES OF U.S. MULTINATIONALS
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Previous research is limited regarding the effects of the HR policies 
of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational companies on union 
activity. An important topic is the extent to which multinationals 
employ practices that can be used to reduce unionization in parent 
company domestic operations and whether they have the same ef-
fect in foreign subsidiaries. In this study, the authors examine the 
effects of a subsidiary’s implementation of high- performance work 
systems, its greenfield site status, and its usage of contract or tempo-
rary workers on union activity within the subsidiary. Results from a 
survey of a number of geographically dispersed foreign subsidiaries 
of U.S.- based multinationals show that greenfield site status has a 
strong, negative effect on subsidiary union activity, whereas high- 
performance work systems have a more modest, negative effect. The 
authors also show that national IR system characteristics moderate 
the effect of HR policies, especially if enterprise unionism plays a 
dominant role in the host country.
Private sector unionism in the United States, which was 6.9% of the pri-vate sector labor force in 2011 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012), has 
declined dramatically from its peak of approximately 35% in the 1950s. Al-
though union decline is fairly widespread globally (Blanchflower 2006, 
2007), the prevalence of unions in foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational 
corporations (MNCs) remains unclear. Tony Edwards and Anthony Ferner 
(2002) argued that the union avoidance strategies adopted by U.S. MNCs 
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abroad have weakened unions in their foreign subsidiaries. Previous re-
search, however, has overlooked the issue of unionization in foreign subsid-
iaries of U.S. MNCs.
Studies of companies operating in North America and some parts of the 
EU have focused on the role of high- performance work systems (HPWSs) in 
union activity within companies (Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Huselid 1995). 
Often seen as union substitution techniques (Fiorito 2001), HPWSs have 
spread extensively to the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. MNCs. Although previ-
ous research has shown that aggressive anti- union strategies play an impor-
tant role in reducing unionization (Lawler 1990), evidence on the effect of 
HPWSs is somewhat mixed.
In this study, the authors use a sample of foreign subsidiaries of American 
MNCs in 12 economically and socially diverse countries in Europe, Africa, 
and Asia. They investigate union activity within these subsidiaries (including 
variations in subsidiary union density and the presence or absence of writ-
ten agreements or formal bargaining relationships with a union) with re-
spect to HPWS usage. This study also investigates two other subsidiary 
organizational human resource (HR) policies in relationship to union activ-
ity. One policy regards the mode of entry into a host country. A subsidiary 
established as a greenfield site in a host country (i.e., a completely new opera-
tion, as opposed to a brownfield site, which is an acquisition of an already es-
tablished enterprise) is less likely to become unionized. This may be, in 
part, management’s intention (Flood and Turner 1993). The second policy 
is to use significant numbers of contingent workers, which might help un-
dercut unionization. The nature of the labor movement within a host coun-
try may also affect the union activity of subsidiaries. Thus, in this study we 
examine the effects of several indicators in host- country industrial relations 
(IR) systems on subsidiary union activity. In post hoc analysis, we consider 
the moderating effect of IR system variables on the relationships between 
organizational HR policies and union activity.
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
This study uses the labor union definition proposed by Bain and Price 
(1980) and adopted by Wallerstein and Western (2000: 357): “an organiza-
tion of employees which seeks to represent the job interests of its members 
to employers and in some circumstances to the state, but which is not domi-
nated by either of them.” To fall under this definition, unions must be, to a 
considerable extent, independent of both employers and the government. 
In this study, we consider only host countries that exhibit these conditions 
(e.g., mainland China and Vietnam have been excluded).
National IR Systems and Union Activity
“Concept stretching” is an important issue in cross- national research (Dun-
lop 1977; Sartori 1984; Collier and Mahon 1997). The concept- stretching 
argument holds that certain constructs can become distorted in multicountry 
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studies, making cross- country comparisons problematic. Equivalent levels of 
subsidiary union activity in two countries may have very different impli-
cations for the strength of a union and the nature of the changes in the 
employment relationship that unionism can affect. More powerful union 
structures are likely to enhance the effect of subsidiary union activity. In this 
study, we also investigate the important national IR system characteristics of 
host countries, which control for relative labor- management power and pro-
vide a means of adjusting for concept- stretching problems. We propose sev-
eral hypotheses regarding the direct linear effects of IR system variables on 
union activity. Our empirical work in this study includes exploratory sensi-
tivity analysis to examine whether IR system variables moderate the rela-
tionships between organizational HR policy variables and subsidiary union 
activity.
According to William Cooke and Deborah Noble (1998), host- country 
union density is a general indicator of the receptiveness of the host- country 
environment to unionization. Greater union presence in the host country is 
likely to be associated with more resources available to support new union 
organizing and establishing unions. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a. A positive relationship exists between host- country 
union density and union activity in the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 
multinationals.
Another important IR system indicator is whether the host country has laws 
or policies promoting or requiring the establishment of works councils in 
companies. The members of works councils are often union activists. Works 
councils complement unions by strengthening employee voice and rein-
forcing trade union goals and objectives:
Hypothesis 1b. A positive relationship exists between host- country 
works council requirements and union activity in the foreign sub-
sidiaries of U.S. multinationals.
Previous research argues that greater bargaining breadth in labor organiza-
tions leads to more power in dealing with employers (Cook and Noble 1998; 
Wallerstein and Western 2000). This suggests the following:
Hypothesis 1c. A positive relationship exists between more central-
ized bargaining within a host country and union activity in the 
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals.
Workers may see fewer benefits to unionization under enterprise unionism 
because they view unions as weaker than multi- company unions (whether 
industrial or craft organizations) (Jeong and Lawler 2007):
Hypothesis 1d. A negative relationship exists between the predomi-
nance of enterprise unionism in a host country and union activity 
in the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals.
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Finally, countries vary in the number of peak labor organizations. More 
peak labor organizations represent greater resource mobilization in sup-
port of unionization and may provide a greater range of choices to employ-
ees. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1e. A positive relationship exists between the number of 
peak labor organizations within a host country and union activity 
in the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals.
Subsidiary HR Policies and Union Activity
High- performance work systems. Several previous studies have linked the imple-
mentation of HPWSs to firm effectiveness (Combs, Liu, Hall, and Ketchen 
2006). Although previous researchers have developed various approaches 
to defining HPWSs, the ability, motivation, opportunity (AMO) framework 
(Blumberg and Pringle 1982; Boselie, Dietz, and Boon 2005) is probably 
the most common. Ability refers to the enhancement of employee knowl-
edge, skills, and abilities through training and rigorous selection pro-
cedures; motivation refers to the enhancement of employee motivation to 
engage in discretionary efforts beneficial to the firm (e.g., merit- and 
performance- based pay); and opportunity refers to workplace empowerment 
and employee involvement, which provide the opportunity for employees 
to engage in productive discretionary efforts. Without specifically using the 
AMO term, David Lepak, Hui Liao, Yunhyung Chung, and Erika Harden 
(2006) defined HPWSs using essentially the same three policy domains. 
Thus, extensive recruitment and selection activities can be used to assess 
potential employee knowledge, skills, and abilities at the entry level. Exten-
sive employee training and development programs can further enhance 
these competencies and skills. To encourage employees to perform, compa-
nies must apply a series of motivational HR practices, such as pay- for- 
performance, financial incentives, and career planning. Finally, companies 
must create multiple channels to engage workers and to give them the op-
portunity to take effective discretionary actions, including workplace em-
powerment, multifaceted jobs, and teamwork. We adopt the framework of 
Lepak et al. (2006) to define HPWSs.
The HPWS approach represents a major departure from more tradi-
tional, control- based employment systems. This approach could substan-
tially alter the environment in which employees, unions, and employers 
interact. A common issue in the literature is that HPWSs shift the focus 
from a collective representation of workers, which favors unionization, to-
ward the “individualization” of the employment relationship (Bacon and 
Storey 1993; Gunnigle 1995; Fey and Björkman 2001). This emphasis on 
individual or group performance and competitiveness conflicts with the 
conventional role played by the collective orientation of union representa-
tion. Although the primary motivation for adopting a HPWS may be its pos-
itive effect on firm performance, many HPWS components are related to 
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successful union substitution strategies (Foulkes 1980; Lawler 1990; Fiorito 
2001; Machin and Wood 2005).
Studies based on the United States have generally shown that HPWSs re-
duce unionization (e.g., Kochan, McKersie, and Chalykoff 1986; Fiorito, 
Lowman, and Nelson 1987; Wells 1993; Lewchuk and Wells 2006). Thomas 
Kochan et al. (1986) found that the number of workplace innovations (i.e., 
HPWS practices) implemented by a company significantly reduce the per-
centage of new facilities organized by unions, regardless of the company’s 
stance on unionization. Jack Fiorito and Angela Young (1998) showed that, 
whereas human resource management (HRM) policies generally reduce 
the likelihood of workers voting for unionization in nonunion settings, their 
effect is weaker than other influences. In another study, Fiorito concluded 
that individual HRM policies generate no stronger effects than a composite 
index of such policies, observing that “the critical issue (may be) a configu-
ration or pattern of practices rather than particular practices” (Fiorito 2001: 
350).
In environments such as Western Europe, where relationships between 
labor and management tend to be more collaborative than in the United 
States, authors have argued for a positive relationship between HPWS im-
plementation and union status. Thomas Turner (1994), however, showed 
no support for a relationship between HPWS usage and unionization in the 
Irish private sector, and the increase of HPWSs over time in the United 
Kingdom did not have a significant effect on unionization (Wood and de 
Menezes 1998; Forth and Millward 2002; Machin and Wood 2005). John 
Godard (2009) contrasted the use of what he termed “alternative work prac-
tices” (AWP) (i.e., worker empowerment) in union representation in Can-
ada and the United Kingdom. The relationship was negative in the case of 
Canadian workers, yet positive in the United Kingdom. Godard suggested 
that labor- management adversarialism in Canada (with an IR system similar 
to the United States) and collaboration in the United Kingdom are the 
 possible reasons behind such links. Shyh- Jer Chen (2007) also found a posi-
tive relationship between a composite HPWS scale and unionization in 
Taiwanese- owned companies.
Previous research has indicated that HPWSs have a single dimension or 
consist of multiple subdimensions. The scale development process in this 
study (discussed in detail below) suggested that the three dimensions of the 
AMO framework and the work of Lepak et al. (2006) could be combined 
into two meaningful scales. The first of these scales was a composite of the 
ability and motivation dimensions (i.e., merit, pay- for- performance, train-
ing, and development), forming the Ability- Motivation scale. The second 
scale consisted primarily of opportunity items (i.e., teamwork, employee dis-
cretion, multitasking, and information sharing), forming the Opportunity 
scale. For ease of presentation, for this study we test HPWS hypotheses by 
referencing these two empirically derived dimensions.
Although prior research has shown conflicting HPWS effects on union 
activity cross- nationally, an important consideration regarding the expected 
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effects of the Ability- Motivation and Opportunity factors in this study is that 
we are dealing exclusively with U.S.- based MNCs. A strong argument has 
been made by others that many U.S. MNCs tend to export strong union 
avoidance ideology internationally (Edwards and Ferner 2002). Therefore, 
it seems reasonable to assume that the organizational climates of these sub-
sidiaries as related to union activity are similar to those of U.S.- based compa-
nies. We will later report the results of sensitivity analysis of our parameter 
estimates to assess the robustness of our findings with respect to this as-
sumption across national IR systems and geographical locations.
We draw from Godard (2009) in developing hypotheses because his ap-
proach to measuring HPWSs is similar to the AMO framework. His “contin-
gent pay” factor clearly corresponds to the motivation components of the 
proposed Ability- Motivation factor. Godard argued that contingent pay sys-
tems stress self- interest, or perhaps group interest, at the expense of organi-
zational solidarity and a perceived community of interests, as would be the 
case under fixed wage and seniority- based pay systems. He argued that firms 
wishing to promote organization- employee fit and utilizing contingent pay 
systems would be more likely to recruit employees who are more individual-
ist than collectivist, and therefore potentially hostile to unionization. This 
reflects the argument that the “individualization” of the employment rela-
tionship occurs under HPWSs (Bacon and Storey 1993; Gunnigle 1995). 
Another factor in Godard’s analysis, “new HR practices,” partly overlaps 
Ability- Motivation, mainly with respect to training practices. He also posited 
that this factor has a negative relationship on unionization in the North 
American context, although this relationship was statistically insignificant in 
his study. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a. A negative relationship exists between Ability- 
Motivation and union activity in the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 
multinationals.
Godard’s AWP factor corresponds closely to the Opportunity factor in 
this study. Godard posited an inverted U- shaped relationship between AWP 
and union representation in the North American context. Godard (2009) 
argued that at lower AWP levels, these practices might be accepted to a 
 limited extent by unionized employees in the adversarial North American 
context, coexisting with union representation. As AWP increase, union re-
sistance grows, so that the relationship becomes negative. His empirical re-
search supported only a negative relationship, however, which seems to 
discount the inverted- U argument, suggesting that these techniques gener-
ally reduce union representation in this context. This may be because par-
ticipation and empowerment techniques act as alternative employee “voice” 
mechanisms and serve as a union substitution device.
Hypothesis 2b. A negative relationship exists between Opportunity 
and union activity in the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals.
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Greenfield sites. Fred Foulkes (1980) showed that companies seeking to 
avoid unionization often replace existing unionized plants with completely 
new facilities, which are frequently located in states with low levels of union-
ization. Such greenfield sites allow a fresh start, with completely new em-
ployees and revamped employment systems. In the context of international 
business, greenfield sites are new subsidiaries built from the ground up, 
whereas brownfield sites are established facilities acquired by multination-
als. Brownfield sites have a legacy of employment practices, worker senti-
ments, and possibly an existing union.
The international IR literature has thoroughly discussed the role that 
greenfield sites might play in preventing unionization in MNC subsidiaries 
(Flood and Turner 1993; Guest and Rosenthal 1993; Gunnigle 1995). Pat-
rick Gunnigle (1995) found no strong relationship between greenfield sta-
tus and unionization in Ireland, although there were substantial differences 
across companies based on national origins. The greenfield site subsidiaries 
of U.S. companies in Ireland were far less likely to become unionized than 
Irish- owned firms or the subsidiaries of European MNCs. More recently, 
Gunnigle, MacCurtain, and Morley (2001) concluded that European com-
panies are now tending to adopt the U.S. approach of using greenfield sites 
as a union avoidance technique. Thus, theory and evidence point to the use 
of greenfield sites as important union- avoidance strategy. U.S. MNCs favor 
greenfield sites in foreign operations because this approach provides the 
option of implementing more individualist employment policies in an un-
fettered way, which might help prevent unionization (Guest and Hoque 
1996).
In assessing the greenfield site literature, Marian Baird and John Leopold 
(2001) noted that international business research has used the greenfield 
construct extensively, especially in the area of union recognition. A green-
field site allows for a clean “break from the past” (Baird and Leopold 2001: 
257) in terms of implementing completely new HR policies and practices. 
This approach is unlike the constraints of a legacy HRM system in brown-
field site acquisitions. It provides an opportunity to create a new organiza-
tional culture that might militate against collective actions by the employees 
(Baird and Leopold 2001). Prior research on greenfield sites, however, has 
often involved small samples or case studies of specific facilities, whereas 
this study uses a large sample of organizations. These arguments suggest the 
following:
Hypothesis 3: Union activity in the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. mul-
tinationals is lower in those begun as greenfield sites than in those 
acquired as established entities (brownfield sites).
Flexible work practices. Another element in overall workforce management 
is the use of flexible work practices, such as functional flexibility in the de-
sign of jobs, part- time employment, layoffs, and temporary and contract 
workers. Alison Booth and Marco Francesconi (2003) and Hazel Conley 
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and Paul Stewart (2008) discussed the various ways in which flexible work 
practices negatively affect unionization. Employees working under flexible 
work practices, and especially contract and temporary workers, may not see 
the value of unionization given their tenuous connection to the employer. 
Jobs under these arrangements are often relatively marginal, which may dis-
courage unions from organizing efforts among these workers. Booth and 
Francesconi (2003) found that in Britain, those workers working under var-
ious flexible employment arrangements were less likely to be unionized 
than those working under standard employment arrangements. Marco 
Francesconi and Carolos Garcia- Serrano (2004) found that temporary and 
contract employment is negatively related to the likelihood of union cover-
age in Spanish enterprises. Conversely, Thomas Turner (1994) showed that 
flexible work practices have no effect on unionization in Ireland. Thus, 
prior research suggests, although somewhat tentatively, that the prevalence 
of temporary and contract workers negatively affects unionization:
Hypothesis 4. A negative relationship exists between the usage of 
temporary and contract workers and union activity in the foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals.
Research Methods
Data Collection
A survey of foreign subsidiaries of U.S.- based MNCs produced the data used 
in this study. The HR director of each subsidiary provided information on 
the subsidiary’s HRM policies and employee characteristics. In this study we 
also analyze information on business operations acquired from a senior 
business manager in each subsidiary and data from other archival sources. 
For each host country, we randomly selected a set of U.S. MNCs from the 
S&P 100 list. We then identified one subsidiary of each of these MNCs based 
on the Directory of American Firms Operating in Foreign Countries (2003). We 
contacted each subsidiary by phone to identify the subsidiary’s senior HR 
manager. Survey instruments were then sent to cooperating subsidiaries, 
one for the senior HR manager and one for a senior business manager (se-
lected by the HR manager).
We obtained useable data from 188 subsidiaries in 12 host countries dis-
tributed across 6 geographical regions: East Asia (Korea: 40; Japan: 11; Tai-
wan: 26), Southeast Asia (Thailand: 17; Singapore: 24), South Asia (India: 
16), Africa (Kenya: 16; South Africa: 9), Western Europe (Italy: 8; Germany: 
7), and Eastern Europe (Romania: 9; Russia: 5). The rates at which con-
tacted subsidiaries agreed to participate and returned useable question-
naires varied by the host countries, with rates of 20% to 50% in Asia and 
Africa (the highest rates being in Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Singapore), 
and only approximately 10% in European countries. Based on these varia-
tions in response rates, we conducted a preliminary analysis to check for 
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response bias. Despite the lack of subsidiary data for nonparticipating sub-
sidiaries, we were able to obtain parent- company data (Hoover’s Directory) for 
return on assets, return on equity, number of employees, and principal in-
dustry for all participating subsidiaries and a sample of nonparticipating 
subsidiaries in each country. The only difference between participating and 
nonparticipating subsidiaries was that the parent companies of participat-
ing subsidiaries had significantly higher global rates of return on assets than 
nonparticipating subsidiaries (p < .01). Thus, companies showed no varia-
tion in distribution with respect to industry or the parent company size. 
These differences were no more pronounced in low return rate countries 
(e.g., Europe) than in high return rate countries.
Measures
Dependent variables. We studied the proposed model against two depen-
dent variables measuring union activity provided by the subsidiaries’ senior 
HR manager. Subsidiary union density refers to the percentage of the com-
pany’s employees who are union members. This variable is an approxima-
tion of the level of support among employees for the union and is therefore 
a general measure of union activity within the subsidiary. A second indicator 
was a dummy variable coded as 1 if the subsidiary had a written agreement 
or formal bargaining relationship with a union, and 0 if not.
Independent variables. Consistent with the framework of Lepak et al. (2006), 
we implemented a set of 21 Likert items (see Appendix) adapted from the 
research of Bae et al. (2003) to measure HPWS implementation. These 
items all refer to employment policies applicable to rank- and- file employ-
ees, who are the most common union constituents. Items were scored in 
such a way that higher values were more consistent, and lower values less 
consistent, with HPWSs.1
We used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to discern the underlying di-
mensions reflected in these items. Initial factor analysis of the HPWS items 
showed three eigenvalues greater than or equal to 1.0, suggesting three dis-
tinct factors, which was consistent with the AMO and Lepak et al. (2006) 
perspectives. The third eigenvalue was just slightly greater than 1.0, how-
ever, and the results of scree plot analysis suggested the likelihood of only 
two meaningful factors. The proposed two- factor model consolidates the 
ability and motivation items into a single factor, with the opportunity items 
serving as the second factor. Based on these results, we moved forward with 
the more parsimonious two- factor model.
In interpreting these factors, for this study we exclude items that cross- 
loaded meaningfully (i.e., factor loadings >.30) on both factors (Table 1). 
Items related to pay- for- performance loaded uniquely on the first factor (la-
beled Ability- Motivation).2 Reverse- scored items indicating that the firm did 
1 As indicated in the Appendix, some items have been reverse- coded to achieve monotonic scales.
2 Only factor loadings >.30 are reported in Table 1.
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not stress seniority in pay decisions nor in promotions are also consistent 
with the motivation aspects of this factor. Several ability items, including 
training items and rigorous selection methods, also loaded meaningfully 
on this factor. Items loading uniquely on the second factor (labeled Oppor-
tunity) included the principal workplace empowerment items (employee 
initiative and judgment, multitasking, and teamwork). The sum of the 
items identified as meaningfully loading on these two factors produced the 
scales used in subsequent regression analysis. The Ability- Motivation scale 
had an alpha value of .71, and the Opportunity scale had an alpha value of 
.63. Although alpha values of less than .70 raise reliability concerns, ex-
ploratory studies such as this often use scales with alpha values in the .60 to 
.70 range.
The two other independent variables were a dummy variable indicating 
whether the subsidiary was started by the U.S. MNC as a greenfield site, as 
measured in the business manager survey, and the percentage of temporary and 
contract workers used in the subsidiary, as measured in the HR manager survey. 
As discussed above for previous studies, we defined a subsidiary as a green-
field site if it began as a completely new organization in the host country, as 
opposed to an acquisition of an established firm (brownfield site).
Host- country level variables related to Hypotheses 1a to 1e were taken 
from multiple archival sources. Data on host- country union density, which are 
not readily available in a single source, were obtained from Hayter (un-
dated, for South Africa, Kenya, Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, Italy, 
and Germany), Visser (2006, for Korea), Blanchflower (2006, for Russia), 
Ratnam and Jain (2002, for India), and the worker- participation.eu website 
Table 1. Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis for Two-Factor Model
Variables Ability-Motivation Opportunity
Considerable resources for training 0.45 0.09
Interpersonal skills training 0.45 0.33
Extensive orientation 0.32 0.28
Rotation among jobs for training 0.43 0.23
Cross-training 0.28 0.23
Promote from within 0.12 0.29
Multitasking 0.10 0.41
Rigorous selection 0.41 0.35
Goal-based appraisals 0.33 0.40
Wide wage differential between high/low performers 0.61 0.07
Pay for performance 0.53 0.21
Employee initiative expected 0.04 0.63
Extensive financial participation 0.50 –0.01
Extensive use of teams 0.03 0.61
Information-sharing with employees 0.39 0.40
Seniority-based promotions (r) 0.43 –0.07
Seniority-based pay (r) 0.43 –0.23
Hired for current skills rather than potential (r) 0.19 0.35
Training is a short-term cost (r) 0.25 0.32
Training primarily skill-based (r) 0.06 0.22
Notes: n = 188. (r) indicates reverse-scored items. Items used in defining the factor are in bold text.
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(2012, for Romania).3 Information on works councils and enterprise unionism 
was obtained from various country profiles prepared by the Economist Intel-
ligence Unit.4 Given the lack of detailed information on bargaining centraliza-
tion in many host countries, differentiation between relatively centralized 
and relatively decentralized collective bargaining is possible only by using 
information provided by Cooke and Noble (1998) and various country pro-
files prepared by the Economist Intelligence Unit. Information on peak fed-
erations was obtained from Economist Intelligence Unit publications and 
the website of the International Trade Union Confederation (http://www 
.ituc- csi.org).
Control variables. The analysis in this study considers several control vari-
ables. Previous research (Elsheik and Bain 1980; Fiorito and Greer 1982; 
Lawler and West 1985; Turner 1994; Fiorito 2001; Thomason 2004; Chen 
2007) suggests that establishment size is positively related to unionization. The 
natural logarithm of the number of employees was used to measure estab-
lishment size. We anticipated establishment age to be positively related to 
unionization (Chen 2007). The declining presence of unions globally 
means that newer subsidiaries have taken root in an era when union organi-
zation is less likely to occur because of declining union resources. Establish-
ment age (i.e., the number of years of subsidiary operation in the host 
country) was obtained from the business manager survey.
Firm unionization studies typically control for industry because manufac-
turing is more prone to unionization than other sectors. This trend is true in 
the United States, Canada, and other regions (Turner 1994; Francesconi and 
Garcia- Serrano 2004; Chen 2007). A series of dummy variables was used to 
represent the major industrial categories of the parent companies, as re-
ported in Hoover’s Business Directory. These were broken down into computer 
and information technology, services (e.g., entertainment, transportation, educa-
tion, and media), banking and finance, electronics (manufacturing), and heavy 
manufacturing (e.g., aerospace and defense, chemicals, industrial manufactur-
ing, and automobiles). Miscellaneous industries served as the reference group.
The proportion of managerial employees in a firm is another organizational- 
level control variable. As the number of managers increases, the level of 
managerial control is likely to increase and may have a dampening effect on 
unionization. The HR manager questionnaire revealed the proportion of 
managerial employees in the subsidiary. The average rate of inflation in the 
host country over the four years preceding data collection served as a na-
tional economic control variable (International Labour Organization n.d.). 
Inflation can lead to increased unionization because employees tend to ex-
perience eroding real wages under inflationary conditions (Fiorito and 
Greer 1982). Table 2 shows descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix 
for all variables in the analysis.
3 Accessed at http://www.worker- participation.eu/Systemes- nationaux/En- Europe/Syndicats/(lan-
guage)/eng- GB.
4 One example would be the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Commerce: China (Febru-
ary 2003).
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Results
Following Chen (2007), we used tobit analysis to estimate the effects of the 
independent and control variables on union density. The indicator for writ-
ten agreement or bargaining relationship was a dummy variable, so we used 
probit analysis in that case. Endogeneity was a potential concern in this 
analysis, especially in the case of the HPWS measures, because a firm’s 
choices regarding HPWS activity might well depend on many of the same 
unobserved factors that condition the organization with respect to union-
ization, thus biasing parameter estimates. In using instrumental variables 
techniques with both tobit and probit analysis, the Ward test for endogene-
ity did not produce significant results. Another estimation problem arose 
from the two levels at which variables were measured (subsidiary level and 
host- country level). We addressed this problem using random- effects tobit 
and probit models. Again, results suggest this was not an issue in our study, 
as the rho coefficient was not significantly different from zero. Thus, we were 
able to estimate parameters using conventional tobit and probit analysis.
Table 3 shows the marginal effects for the tobit and probit functions for 
the basic model. The marginal effects for continuous variables are first de-
rivatives. Because all continuous predictor variables were standardized, the 
marginal effects in those cases can be interpreted as the instantaneous rate 
of change in subsidiary union density or the probability of a bargaining re-
lationship per one standard deviation change in the predictor. In the case 
of dummy variables, marginal effects are discrete changes in the dependent 
variable for a 0 to 1 change in the value of the independent variable.
Model Estimation
The overall model for subsidiary union density was significant at the .001 
level, although the pseudo- R2 was relatively modest at approximately .07 
(Table 3). The model included three groups of variables: control variables, 
IR system variables (related to Hypotheses 1a to 1e), and organizational HR 
policy variables (related to Hypotheses 2a to 4). Likelihood ratio tests were 
used to assess the overall significance of each of these sets of variables 
(Table 3).
Only Hypothesis 1d was supported for the IR system variables in the case 
of subsidiary union density. The dominance of enterprise unionism was 
negatively related to subsidiary union density (p < .05). Although the num-
ber of host- country peak federations was marginally significant (p < .10), 
this was negative and counter to expectation (Hypothesis 1e). As predicted 
by Hypothesis 2a, Ability- Motivation was significant (p < .05) and negative. 
The greenfield site indicator was also negative and statistically significant 
(p < .01), consistent with Hypothesis 3. Neither Opportunity nor the per-
centage of temporary and contract workers was statistically significant. Thus, 
Hypotheses 2b and 4 were not supported in the case of subsidiary union 
density.
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The overall probit model for the presence of a written agreement or for-
mal bargaining relationship was significant at the .001 level with a pseudo-
 R2 of .26 (Table 3). In the case of the IR system variables, the enterprise 
unionism variable was negative and significant (p < .05), consistent with Hy-
pothesis 1d. The centralized bargaining variable was positive and significant 
(p < .01), consistent with Hypothesis 1c. The other individual IR system vari-
ables were not statistically significant. One of the organizational policy vari-
ables (i.e., greenfield site) was significant (p < .01) and negative, consistent 
with Hypothesis 3.
Sensitivity Analysis
Given the concept- stretching problem, the characteristics of national IR sys-
tems should be examined in relation to their effects on subsidiary union 
activity. The results of this study show support for some hypothesized direct 
IR system effects; however, IR system variables might also moderate the rela-
tionships between organizational HR policy variables and subsidiary union 
activity. To conduct this post hoc analysis, we use two- way interaction terms 
composed of each organizational policy variable multiplied by each IR system 
Table 3. Marginal Effects for Basic Model
Dependent variables
Subsidiary union 
density (tobit)
Written agreement or 
bargaining relationship 
in subsidiary (probit)
Control variables ?2(8) = 35.63*** ?2(8) = 18.85**
Industry dummy variables
 Computers and information technologya –3.82 (–1.05) –0.003 (–0.04)
 Servicesa –4.69 (–1.23) –0.10 (–1.06)
 Banking and Financea 3.64 (0.78) 0.02 (0.12)
 Electronicsa 1.49 (0.46) –0.16 (–1.53)
 Heavy Manufacturinga 0.73 (0.27) 0.04 (0.52)
 Organizational age 2.59 (2.40)** 0.06 (1.97)**
 Employees (ln) 3.73 (3.08)*** 0.05 (1.14)
 Percentage managers –0.73 (–0.66) 0.01 (0.64)
 Host-country average inflation –0.58 (–0.40) –0.04 (–0.85)
IR system variables ?2(5) = 10.38* ?2(5) = 20.14**
 Host-Country union density –0.42 (–0.28) –0.02 (–0.46)
 Works Council law in host countrya 1.88 (0.74) –0.09 (–1.40)
 Enterprise unionism dominant in host countrya –6.07 (–2.35)** –0.19 (–2.76)***
 Centralized bargaininga –1.19 (–0.44) 0.12 (1.66)*
 Peak federations –2.83 (–1.85)* –0.01 (–0.21)
Organizational HR policies ?2(4) = 26.98*** ?2(4) = 8.39*
 Ability-Motivation –2.63 (–2.16)** –0.01 (–0.49)
 Opportunity 0.86 (0.74) –0.003 (–0.09)
 Greenfield sitea –9.83 (–4.88)*** –0.14 (–2.64)***
 Percentage of contract or temporary workers –0.49 (–0.49) 0.02 (0.74)
Overall ?2 46.31*** 47.97***
pseudo-R2 0.07 0.26
Notes: two-tailed tests; n = 188. z scores for parameter estimates are in parentheses.
aMarginal effects are discrete changes for dummy variable changes from 0 to 1.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
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variable. We do not test specific hypotheses in the usual sense. Tests of statis-
tical significance for the interaction terms are indicative of a coefficient 
being large relative to its standard error. This finding motivates inductive 
observations as potential explanations to be investigated in future research, 
but is not a definitive test of a priori hypotheses.
Because there were 20 national IR system ? HR policy interaction terms, 
we use hierarichal stepwise estimation to help identify a limited set of inter-
action effects in the interest of suggesting a relatively parsimonious modifi-
cation of the model. After including all of the variables specified in the 
original model (Table 3), the final model included only those interaction 
terms for which p < .05. We further refined the model by making Bonferroni 
adjustments5 in probablility levels of the initially included interaction terms, 
discarding those interaction terms for which the adjusted p- values were 
greater than .05.
Table 4 presents the results of this analysis.6 These results show four inter-
action effects with sufficiently high p- values in the subsidiary union density 
equation, all of which were negative. The pseudo- R2 (.13) was substantially 
improved with the addition of these interaction terms, suggesting that they 
made a meaningful contribution to the explanatory power of the model. 
Thus, host- country union density, works council laws, and dominant enter-
prise unionism appear to reduce the relationship between subsidiary union 
density and Opportunity. The same trend appeared for the relationship be-
tween subsidiary union density and percentage of temporary/contract 
workers in the case of dominant enterprise unionism. Analysis of the written 
agreement/bargaining relationship variable shows two interaction effects 
with adjusted p- values < .05 (Table 4). Again, the pseudo- R2 increase is sub-
stantial (.34) relative to the basic model (Table 3). Dominant enterprise 
unionism negatively affects both the greenfield site and percentage of tem-
porary/contract workers. The following sections present a discussion of the 
relevance of these findings in greater detail.
Although this study considers 12 countries, the sample was largely con-
centrated in 5 East and Southeast Asian nations (118 out of the 188 cases) 
because of differential return rates. Thus, the parameter estimates for orga-
nizational HR policy variables might be overly influenced by the East and 
Southeast Asian cases. Therefore, we created a dummy variable differentiat-
ing the East and Southeast Asian countries from the other countries and 
examined the interaction effects between this variable and the organiza-
tional HR policy variables. Using the same stepwise estimation approach 
described above, we contrasted a model with all of the linear terms and the 
significant interactions noted above to a model including the region ? HR 
policy interactions, for those with p < .05. This condition was not met for any 
5 The Bonferroni adjustment decreases false positive errors when several individual relationships are 
examined in the absence of a priori hypotheses.
6 The marginal effects for the control variables are not reported, although those variables were in-
cluded in the analyses.
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of these interactions for both dependent variables. These results suggest 
that there were no additional differences between East and Southeast Asian 
host countries and the rest of the sample beyond what was already captured 
by the linear terms and IR system ? HR policy interactions.
Discussion
The empirical analysis in this study supported certain elements of the basic 
model. Sensitivity analysis indicated that IR system variables could play a 
meaningful moderating role in organizational policy–union activity relation-
ships across host countries.
Implications of the Basic Model
Our analysis generated various results for subsidiary union density versus 
the existence of a written agreement or formal bargaining relationship. In 
the former case, the Ability- Motivation scale had a pronounced negative ef-
fect, as predicted. This particular aspect of the HR system is highly con-
nected to the process of individualization of the employment system (Bacon 
and Storey 1993; Gunnigle 1995) and renders the organizational environ-
ment less conducive to union activity. When evaluated at the means of the 
Table 4. Results of Sensitivity Analysisa
Dependent variables
Independent variables
Subsidiary union 
density (tobit)
Written agreement or 
bargaining relationship 
in subsidiary (probit)
IR system variables ?2(5) = 9.85* ?2(5) = 5.37ns
 Host-country union density –0.61 (1.52) –0.03 (–.81)
 Works Council law in host countryb 1.38 (0.54) –0.06 (–0.94)
 Enterprise Unionism dominant in host countryb –3.94 (–1.58) –0.03 (–.39)
 Centralized bargaining –0.61 (–0.24) 0.11 (1.50)
 Peak federation –3.89 (–2.43)** –0.02 (–0.79)**
Organizational HR policies ?2(4) = 39.69*** ?2(4) =9.95*
 Ability-Motivation –2.74 (–1.42) –0.02 (–0.81)
 Opportunity 10.01 (4.17)*** –0.001 (0.02)
 Greenfield siteb –9.55 (–4.96)*** 0.06 (0.66)
 Percentage of contract or temporary workers 5.02 (1.99)** 0.20 (2.55)**
Interactions ?2(4) = 22.35*** ?2(2) = 14.30***
 Host-country union density × Opportunity –3.99 (–2.75)***
 Works Council Law × Opportunity –8.30 (–3.10)***
 Enterprise Unionism dominant × Opportunity –10.81 (–3.56)***
 Enterprise Unionism dominant × Percentage contract 
  and temporary worker –5.68 (–2.05)** –0.21 (–2.52)**
 Enterprise Unionism dominant × Greenfield site –0.29 (–2.52)**
Overall ?2 95.64*** 62.27
pseudo-R2 0.13 0.34
Notes: two-tailed tests; n = 188; z-scores for parameter estimates are in parentheses.
aThis table includes the same control variables as in Table 3. The marginal effects for those variables are 
not reported to conserve on space.
bMarginal effects are discrete changes of dummy variables from 0 to 1.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
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other variables in the equation, the marginal effect is approximately 
–2.6 percentage points per standard deviation change in Ability- Motivation 
(Table 3). Because the tobit model is nonlinear, effect sizes change as a 
function of all of the variables in the equation, complicating the interpreta-
tion of this value. However, this coefficient suggests a meaningful effect, 
with a shift from a low Ability- Motivation scale value, as in more traditional 
HR systems, to a high Ability- Motivation level in strong HPWSs. Such a 
change could affect subsidiary union density by more than 10 percentage 
points. The greenfield site variable also exerted a negative relationship on 
subsidiary union density. The effect size indicated that, at the mean values 
of the other predictor variables, subsidiary union density was also lower by 
approximately 10 percentage points in greenfield sites compared with 
brownfield sites. As such, “breaking with the past” (Baird and Leopold 
2001), with all its potential associated advantages as an employment strat-
egy, significantly decreases union affiliation within companies.
The national IR system variables, conversely, did not appear to play sig-
nificant roles in the subsidiary union density equation as predicted, except 
that subsidiary union density was approximately 6 percentage points lower 
in countries with enterprise unionism dominating. Contrary to expecta-
tions, increasing the numbers of peak federations actually led to a signifi-
cant decline in subsidiary union density (slightly less than 3 percentage 
points). It appears that the dispersion of organizing resources and the ad-
verse effect of possible interunion rivalries may more than compensate for 
any of the advantages to unionization associated with multiple peak labor 
organizations appealing to diverse employee interests.
Findings with respect to the probability of a written agreement or bar-
gaining relationship differed significantly from those related to subsidiary 
union density. Of the organizational HR policy variables, only the green-
field site variable had the expected negative effect. The effect size was none-
theless strong, indicating a 14 percentage point lower probability of an 
agreement or relationship in greenfield sites than in brownfield sites (Table 
3). Conversely, national IR system variables had a greater effect on this out-
come than in the case of subsidiary union density. Centralized bargaining, 
evaluated at the means of the predictor variables, increased the probability 
of a written agreement or bargaining relationship by approximately 12 per-
centage points, whereas this probability was 19 percentage points less in 
countries with dominant enterprise unionism.
Implications of the Sensitivity Analysis
The results of post hoc sensitivity analysis show that IR system variables in-
teracted with organizational HR policies in complex ways not fully antici-
pated by extant theory and that are obscured in the basic model.
Results show four significant interaction effects where p < .05 in the sub-
sidiary union density equation (Table 4). The jump in the pseudo- R2 value 
from .07 to .13 (Table 3) suggests that the IR system variables play important 
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roles in moderating the effects of the subsidiary HR policies on subsidiary 
union density. Three of these interaction effects relate to the effect of Op-
portunity, which has no significant effect on subsidiary union density in the 
basic model.
Given the coding of IR system variables in these interaction terms, the 
parameter estimates shown in Table 4 indicate that Opportunity exerted a 
strong positive effect (p < .01) in countries where enterprise unionism did 
not dominate, works councils were not present, and in which host- country 
union density was moderate to low. This finding agrees with previously cited 
studies suggesting institutional circumstances occur under which aspects of 
HPWSs, especially those related to employee participation and empower-
ment, contribute to a positive HPWS- union activity relationship. That re-
search (e.g., Godard 2009) dealt mainly with companies that were not 
U.S.- based, whereas the current study suggests this possibility in the foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals. Lower host- country union density could 
mean the absence of a strong external union movement that might view 
workplace empowerment and employee participation as a threat to its sur-
vival and contrary to its ideology. The absence of works councils excludes 
alternative entities that might compete with the subsidiary’s union. Such 
conditions could generate the sort of collaborative organizational climates 
that promote a positive Opportunity- union activity relationship (Turner 
1994; Chen 2007; Godard 2009). Such settings encourage a relatively weak 
trade union environment, and subsidiary labor organizations might then 
feel unable to challenge management over Opportunity issues. In fact, a 
union might be co- opted into supporting these initiatives, hence generating 
a positive Opportunity- subsidiary union density relationship. Increased 
host- country union density and works- council laws alter these dynamics, 
dampening and potentially reversing the Opportunity- subsidiary union 
density relationship. Under these conditions, employers might be more 
likely to present participation and empowerment as an alternative “voice” 
mechanism for employees, serving more intensively as a means of support-
ing union substitution objectives.
We argued earlier that enterprise unionism is typically related to weaker 
labor organizations than areas in which unions are organized on a multi-
company or industrial basis. This assumption is supported by the findings of 
the basic model and is based on the negative enterprise unionism linear ef-
fects of both dependent variables (Hypothesis 1d). In contrasting non- 
enterprise union environments to those in which enterprise unionism is 
dominant, we might expect an organizational climate in which unions are at 
a disadvantage compared to management and where participation and em-
powerment might readily serve as union substitution techniques. Given the 
magnitude of the Opportunity x enterprise unionism interaction effect, the 
total Opportunity effect for subsidiary union density is substantially damp-
ened, if not reversed, under those circumstances. To some extent, this con-
tradicts the other two Opportunity- related interaction effects, clearly making 
it an issue that requires further study and theoretical refinement.
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This study also shows one significant interaction effect in the case of the 
percentage of contract or temporary workers. Again, the linear contract/
temporary worker relationship is strongly positive (p < .05) in countries 
without dominant enterprise unionism. In these environments, strong 
unions may be capable of securing support from employees even in the face 
of “outsourcing” efforts. Indeed, such outsourcing might generate antago-
nism toward management and mobilize employees the greater the extent to 
which management might rely on this tool (hence the positive relation-
ship). The negative enterprise union ? percentage contract/temporary 
workers interaction can be understood in the same way as Opportunity. 
Labor organizations in enterprise union contexts are often less able to resist 
the adverse effects of management’s use of contract/temporary workers on 
union organizing, substantially dampening, and possibly reversing the posi-
tive effects of contract/temporary workers on subsidiary union density.
Results of this study show two interaction effects for which p < .05 for the 
bargaining relationship/written agreement equation. Both of these effects 
involve dominant enterprise unionism as the moderating variable. Both in-
teraction effects are negative, suggesting dynamics similar to those in the 
enterprise union interactions considered above. In the absence of enter-
prise unionism, labor organizations may be able to forestall strong down-
ward pressure on the establishment of bargaining relationships or written 
agreements. The weakening of the labor movement in enterprise union set-
tings could make it considerably more difficult for unions to overcome the 
difficulties of organizing a greenfield site, which is the reason for a negative 
total effect for greenfield site in such situations. The percentage of contract 
and temporary workers demonstrates a strongly positive relationship with 
the probability of a bargaining relationship or written agreement (p < .05) 
(Table 4) in non-enterprise union settings. This effect decreases to nearly 
zero when enterprise unionism is dominant. Again, this can be attributed to 
weaker labor organizations, which are less able to forestall outsourcing ef-
forts and their effects on unionization.
Conclusions
Based on this study, we reach the following major conclusions.
1. Subsidiaries that are established as greenfield sites generally have 
lower levels of union activity than do brownfield sites. For U.S. multination-
als, starting a completely new organization when opening a foreign subsid-
iary seems to be a potent means of limiting union activity. Enterprise union 
dominance in the host country moderated this effect in the case of the 
probability of written agreement or bargaining relationship.
2. HPWSs affected union activity, but in somewhat complex ways. Ability- 
Motivation had a generally negative effect on subsidiary union density, al-
though its effects were not intertwined with those of national IR system 
variables. Although the basic model did not show any effect on union ac-
tivity exerted by Opportunity, the results of our sensitivity analysis strongly 
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suggest that its effect is complex and tied in multiple ways to IR system vari-
ables in the case of subsidiary union density.
3. The percentage of contract or temporary workers used by the subsid-
iary had some effects on both aspects of union activity, but these effects ap-
pear to depend on certain national IR system variables.
4. IR system variables had some direct effects on union activity, but these 
effects appeared to be especially important as moderators of the relation-
ships between organizational HR policies and union activity. Therefore, the 
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals do not operate in a singular man-
ner, but appear to be influenced by the host- country national context. En-
terprise unionism dominance in the host country was particularly important 
and interacted in theoretically consistent ways.
5. The exact mechanisms through which national IR system variables in-
teract with subsidiary HR policies require further investigation. This study 
could serve as a basis for further theoretical and empirical work.
6. Although the Ability- Motivation factor is largely related to “individual-
ization” of HRM, the Opportunity factor is more relevant to the “sociality” 
of HRM. The sensitivity analysis in this study shows that the Opportunity 
factor could have a positive effect on union activity under certain circum-
stances, unlike that of the Ability- Motivation factor. Hence, the overall effect 
of HPWSs on unionization and union activity may depend on the relative 
dominance of the HPWS factors (i.e., Ability- Motivation factor dominance 
or Opportunity factor dominance). If a subsidiary has a HPWS with a rela-
tively high Opportunity factor, the overall effect of HPWS on union activity 
may be positive rather than negative. This issue requires further research.
We encountered particular problems in securing the survey participation 
of firms in Europe, which might have affected our findings. Because impor-
tant geographical areas are not represented in the study, particularly Latin 
America and the Middle East, further research should examine subsidiary 
HR policies and union activity in these regions. Although we found no sig-
nificant differences in the effect of HR policies between East and Southeast 
Asia countries and the other countries in the sample, the sample size lim-
ited our ability to perform more in- depth analysis relative to the other coun-
tries. Important effects, especially in the sensitivity analysis, were observed 
in the countries with dominant enterprise unionism, which is pervasive in 
the East and Southeast Asian countries in this sample. Thus, the composi-
tion of the sample may have limited the variability of this factor, and per-
haps other variables as well. These limitations may constrain the applicability 
of these findings.
Comparisons with locally owned companies and subsidiaries of non- U.S. 
MNCs are important to rounding out our knowledge of these issues. Al-
though such studies have been conducted in one or two countries, more 
global analysis is needed. We should not ignore conducting case studies 
using qualitative analysis, and especially studies that contrast employer re-
sponses to the possibility of using employment practices as union avoidance 
techniques in different countries.
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Appendix
Items for High- Performance Work System Scales
The Opportunity and Ability- Motivation scales for rank- and- file employees were based on the 
following items. Respondents answered all questions using five- point anchors ranging from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The subsidiary’s senior HR manager provided these 
data. The term (r) indicates a reverse- scored item. Following the AMO framework, each item 
is marked as being primarily an ability (A), motivation (M), or opportunity (O) item.
 1. This subsidiary devotes considerable resources to employee training and development. (A)
 2. This subsidiary offers training to improve the interpersonal skills of employees. (A)
 3. New employees undergo extensive orientation training to learn the values and culture of this subsid-
iary and/or its American parent company. (A)
 4. Many of this subsidiary’s employees are moved through a series of different job assignments to prepare 
them for future assignments. (A)
 5. Training is primarily intended to prepare employees for their current jobs rather than provide more 
general knowledge. (r) (A)
 6. Training in this subsidiary is viewed by management more as a short- term cost than a long- term in-
vestment. (r) (O)
 7. We do considerable cross- training so that employees are familiar with different jobs and can fill in for 
others when necessary. (A)
 8. Except for entry- level positions, job vacancies in this subsidiary are generally filled from within. (M)
 9. Employees are expected to perform a wide variety of different tasks as needs arise. (O)
10. Promotions in this subsidiary usually go to the applicant who has worked the longest for the company. 
(r) (M)
11. The employee selection process in this subsidiary is rigorous (e.g., use of tests, aptitude test, interviews, 
etc.). (A)
12. Hiring decisions in this subsidiary are based more on employees’ existing skills rather than on their 
potential. (r) (O)
13. An employee’s job performance is appraised, to a significant extent, on the extent to which he or she 
has achieved measurable goals. (M)
14. We strive to keep a large salary difference between high and low performers in the same position. (M)
15. An employee’s seniority is an important factor in determining pay in this subsidiary. (r) (M)
16. An employee’s pay is closely tied to individual or group performance in this subsidiary. (M)
17. Employee financial participation (e.g., gain sharing, profit sharing, or employee ownership, etc.) is 
extensive in this subsidiary. (M)
18. Employees often work in self- directed teams. (O)
19. This subsidiary extensively shares its financial and/or performance information with its employees. (M)
20. Employees are expected to exercise considerable initiative and judgment on the job. (O)
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